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Abstract: Autonomous vehicle localization, mapping and planning in un-reactive environments are well-understood, but
the human factors of complex interactions with other road users are not yet developed. This study presents an
initial model for negotiation between an autonomous vehicle and another vehicle at an unsigned intersections
or (equivalently) with a pedestrian at an unsigned road-crossing (jaywalking), using discrete sequential game
theory. The model is intended as a basic framework for more realistic and data-driven future extensions. The
model shows that when only vehicle position is used to signal intent, the optimal behaviors for both agents
must include a non-zero probability of allowing a collision to occur. This suggests extensions to reduce this
probability in future, such as other forms of signaling and control. Unlike most Game Theory applications in
Economics, active vehicle control requires real-time selection from multiple equilibria with no history, and we
present and argue for a novel solution concept, meta-strategy convergence, suited to this task.
1 Introduction
Automated vehicle (AV) localization, mapping, and
planning have recently become practically feasible due to
price falls in computer processing power. The problem of
simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) is well un-
derstood (Thrun et al., 2005), and despite its exact solution
being NP-hard (Soto-Alvarez and Honkamaa, 2014), good
approximations exist such as particle filtering, which make
use of large compute power to draw samples near solu-
tions. Route planning in non-interactive environments also
has well known tractable solutions such as the A-star algo-
rithm. Given a route, localizing and control to follow that
route then becomes a similar task to that performed by the
1959 General Motors Firebird-III self-driving car (Bidwell
et al., 1959), which used electromagnetic sensing to follow
a wire built into the road. Such path following, using wires
or SLAM, can then be augmented with simple safety logic
to stop the vehicle if any obstacle is in its way, as detected
by any range sensor. Free and open source systems for this
level of ‘self-driving’ are now widely available (Kato et al.,
2015).
In contrast, problems that these vehicles will face
around interacting with other road users are much harder
both to formulate and solve. Autonomous vehicles do
not just have to deal with inanimate objects, sensors, and
maps. They have to deal with other agents, currently human
drivers and pedestrians and eventually other autonomous
vehicles, all of which may be at least as “intelligent” and
“rational” as they are, and in competition with them for
space, time and priority on the road. Recent studies have
shown (Madigan et al., 2016) that in trials of autonomous
minibuses, pedestrians knowingly obstruct autonomous ve-
hicles around once every three hours – enough to occur once
every day on a long commute. Once human road users know
that AV safety systems are programmed to stop if any obsta-
cle is in their path, they can quickly take advantage of this
to push in front of the AV and take priority. If this becomes
common knowledge across a whole city, AVs will make lit-
tle or no progress because they will be forced to yield at
every single interaction.
Understanding and predicting other agents’ behavior,
especially when that includes understanding and predict-
ing their understandings and predictions of oneself, and of
one’s understanding and predictions of them, ad infinitum,
is a massively more complex problem than inferring loca-
tions and maps. It may even be formally uncomputable as
it requires predictions of and actions based on one’s future
behavior (via the other party’s models of it), which are well
known in Computer Science to lead to paradox and uncom-
putability as in Go¨del’s theorem and the Halting problem
(Velupillai, 2009).
Game Theory provides some framework for manag-
ing such self-referential decisions, but appears to be in-
complete as a prescriptive theory when multiple equilib-
ria are present. Solutions may be formally computation-
ally intractable (NP-hard) in some cases (Papadimitriou and
Roughgarden, 2005). And when multiple equilibria are
present, it is not clear whether game theory or any other
rational line of argument will ever be able to even formu-
late the problems, let alone solve them. A simple exam-
ple of game theory is the classic game ‘Chicken’, in which
two cars each drive straight towards each other at speed or
swerve away, and the nominal loser (the ‘chicken’) is the
one to swerve, but both players are much bigger losers if
they both do not swerve, and collide. The classic formal
Chicken model makes the strong and unrealistic assump-
tion that the straight/swerve decision is made as a pair of
simultaneous action selections, (aY ,aX ) by both players (Y
and X) so that the payoff values given the actions can be
represented as a 2×2 matrix of pairs (vYaY ,aX ,v
X
aY ,aX ) :
Y \ X aX=swerve aX =straight
aY=swerve (0,0) (-1, +1)
aY =straight (+1, -1) (-100,-100)
The central concept of game theory is equilibrium
(Nash et al., 1950) which for a 2×2 matrix game as above
describes any pair of strategies for the two players such that
if either player knew the other’s they would not change their
own. Conceptually, if equilibria exist then one can usually
be found via ‘fictitious play’, i.e. each player simulates her
and her opponent’s behaviour in a virtual world where they
know each other’s strategies, until they converge. Strate-
gies are probability distributions over actions. If a game has
only one equilibrium then it is optimal for both players to
play its strategies. When there are multiple equilibria, the
question of what to do is less clear. Historically, Game The-
ory has focused on description of observed behaviors (how
do people act? Why did the chicken cross the road?) and
mechanism design (how can government make them act?)
rather than prescription (when should we act? When should
the chicken cross the road?) of real-time action selection by
agents. This is due to its roots in economics and mathemat-
ics rather than robotics. This distinction becomes crucial
when multiple equilibria are present in a game. The descrip-
tive school would say that any of the equilibria are valid
descriptions of what might be observed in human behavior
data (Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009). The ‘mechanism design’
school typically argues (Palfrey, 1990) that the problem of
equilibrium selection is ‘unpleasant’ and should be avoided
by changing the rules of the game to produce a single un-
ambiguous equilibrium which all players can usefully use.
For cases where the equilibrium selection problem cannot
be avoided in these ways, many different solution concepts
(aka. ‘equilibrium refinements’) have been proposed and
debated (Binmore, 2007) for choosing between them. Two
of these are widely acknowledged to be ‘rational’ when ap-
plied in order: 1. Dominance - Clearly, if an equilibrium is
worse for all players than at least one other, then we discard
it without question; 2. Evolutionary stability / symmetry
(ESS) - Assume everyone in the world was to use the same
equilibrium as me. Discard equilibria where this would not
work. These concepts help to reduce the number of po-
tential multiple equilibria but do not guarantee reduction
to a unique one. To discard further equilibria, more con-
troversial concepts have been debated (Binmore, 2007) in-
cluding: 1. Trembling hand stability - Assume other player
has a small epsilon probability of making a mistake; pre-
fer equilibria that we converge back to if that happens; 2.
Basin size (aka. ‘risk dominance’). Assume both players
use fictitious play starting from maximum entropy strate-
gies. Consider which equilibrium attracts from the most
start points, and this thus most likely to occur. 3. Social
maximum (aka. ‘payoff dominance’) Choose the equilib-
rium with the largest sum of payoffs to all players (even if
I am worse off than in others). 4. Other arbitrary conven-
tions. Such as using the action with the first letter in the
Figure 1: Scenario and model.
alphabet. These work only if all players agree to use them
in advance or can be argued to possess social knowledge to
make them confident that others will choose the same ones
as them. This appears to be the point where the mathemat-
ics of Game Theory ends, and philosophical debate about
the meaning of ‘rationality’ takes its place (Binmore, 2007).
However, as autonomous vehicle engineers building real-
time control systems, we must make some action selection
in these situations, somehow.
Chicken is intended as a simple educational example
game and not as a model of real vehicles. This study mod-
ifies it into a general and more realistic vehicle interaction
problem, where an AV competes for priority with another
vehicle or a pedestrian stepping out in front of it, and allow-
ing them to negotiate with one another by observing each
others’ behaviour over time. Initially we consider the sim-
plest possible model of this class of problems, of an AV
and another similar vehicle approaching an unmarked inter-
section at speed as in fig. 1(left). This would also apply
to the case of two pedestrians meeting each other and ne-
gotiating for space. We then extend it to cases where the
two players have asymmetric penalties in the event of colli-
sion – modeling an AV encountering a potential jaywalker
stepping into the road, or an AV encountering a physically
larger or smaller vehicle such as an armored SUV or cyclist
at an intersection. The model proposed here is intended to
be the simplest possible which captures the dynamics of in-
terest common to these cases, but which can also serve as a
foundation for many more complex ones.
Game theory is used extensively in macroscopic traffic
modeling via Wardrop equilibrium in flow networks (Bol-
land et al., 1979) with focus on route selection in large,
economy-like, markets of many road users rather than mi-
croscopic pairwise interactions. Where game theory has
been applied to pairwise traffic decisions, it has mostly
been at the level of simple single-shot games as reviewed
in (Elvik, 2014). In a few cases such as lane-changing
(Meng et al., 2016; Kim and Langari, 2014) and merging
(Kita, 1999) it has been extended to sequential games as
used here, but not for AV-pedestrian interactions as here.
The meta-strategy convergence concept used here is novel
to our knowledge, as is the use of the sequential model as a
foundation for AV-human intersection and jaywalking con-
trol.
2 Methods
Turn-taking model. In the simplest possible model we
set up two symmetric agents (vehicles or pedestrians) ap-
proaching an intersection as a chess-like, discrete space,
discrete speed, and discrete time, turn-taking game, as in
fig. 1(right). This does not yet use any Game Theory be-
cause the players’ decisions are not made at the same time.
We will use it to introduce notation and as a base to grow
more detailed models. We assume a (1 meter) grid world,
with two straight roads at right angles meeting at the inter-
section. Assume one vehicle on each road, labeled1 Y and
X . (We will later consider one player to be a pedestrian
or different types of vehicle.) Assume discrete alternating
turns one per second, in which one vehicle can choose ei-
ther a 1m/s or 2m/s speed, i.e. move either one box forward
or two boxes forward. (This ensures a finite game, because
the vehicles are guaranteed to move closer to the intersec-
tion at each step. Formally, y and x are decreasing variants.)
2m/s is a slow real world speed but is chosen to coincide
with simple integer movements of 1 or 2 boxes per turn.
(The reader may wish to multiply all distances and speeds
by 10 if they wish to think in more real-world units.) Write
y for Y’s distance in meters to the intersection, x for X’s dis-
tance in meters. Assume a crash occurs if the vehicles are
in the same square or if one vehicle is in the intersection
square and the other moves through it in a single step. (This
may be implemented by treating (y,x) ∈ {(0,0),(1,1)} as
crash states, and all other states with one agent at 0 or 1 as
non-crash endgame states, avoiding the need to model nega-
tive positions beyond the intersection.) We assign (negative)
utilityUcrash to each player for a crash; otherwise −UtimeT
where T is the number of seconds it takes to reach the in-
tersection from the start of the game, andUtime is the (posi-
tive) value of saving one second of travel time. Assume that
both players have identical utility functions, and know this
to be the case. This game can be played, for example, as
a board game between two human players. The turn-taking
model can be solved by a standard (Rich and Knight, 1991)
backward induction max-max tree search as in algorithm 1,
where the boolean b represents which player’s turn is cur-
rent, t is time elapsed, y and x are the two players’ positions,
and the results are expected value pairs for the two players,
vy,x,t,b =(v
Y
y,x,t,b,v
X
y,x,t,b).
Sequential chicken model. If we replace turn-taking by
simultaneous action selection by both players at each dis-
crete 1s turn, the model transforms into a sequence of Game
Theoretic matrix games (“sub-games”). This is equiva-
lent to a board game where both players write down their
speed choice (1 or 2) in secret then reveal them and make
the moves together rather than in turns. The payoffs of
any sub-game at state (y > 1,x > 1, t) become recursive
functions of the next states, (y− aY ,x− aX , t + 1), where
aY ,aX ∈ {1,2} are the speed selection actions for speeds of
1m/s and 2m/s. As in the turn-taking model, these inductive
values are based on the endgame states when one or both
vehicles have reached the intersection (considered to occur
at square 0 or 1). Consider the value vy,x,t = (v
Y
y,x,t ,v
X
y,x,t) of
1We use the convention of writing Y before X, and
the orientation of the grid world of fig. 1, to match
(row,column) matrix notation.
the sub-game when the game is in state (y,x, t). The induc-
tion relation for this sub-game’s payoff matrix is,
vy,x,t = v(
[
v(y−1,x−1, t+1) v(y−1,x−2, t+1)
v(y−2,x−1, t+1) v(y−2,x−2, t+1)
]
)
and is computable via standard matrix Game Theory. Op-
timal mixed strategies, where they exist, and resulting state
probabilities given an initial start state, for this model are
shown in fig. 2.
Algorithm 1
world_value((y,x,t,b)) =
if y==x==0 or y==x==1
or (y==1 and x==0) or (y==0 and x==1)
or (y==0 and x==-1) or (y==-1 and x==0):
(-100,-100) #crash
if y<=0 or x<=0:
(-t-y/2 , -t-x/2) #someone arrives
if b: #recursion
mymax(world_value((y-2,x,t+1,False)),
world_value((y-1,x,t+1,False)))
if not b: #recursion
yourmax(world_value((y, x-2, t+1, True)),
world_value((y, x-1, t+1, True)))
Asymmetric utility model. A final model asks what hap-
pens if the two players have different collision utilities. This
occurs for example if one player has a heavier/safer car than
the other, such as an SUV (Sports Utility Vehicle). Or if
one player is a weaker road user such as a cyclist, or a
pedestrian negotiating to cross the road in a conflict zone
in front of our AV. Will even a small change in these util-
ities break the symmetry of the sequential chicken model
and tip the balance of who yields? If so, this would give
a rational justification for the purchase of heavy vehicles
such as SUVs: the intent of such purchases is not to actu-
ally get into collisions and benefit from reduced damage,
but rather to maintain the possibility, however remote, of
such a disaster, and exploit the backward induction from
it to obtain concessions in more benign possible worlds,
namely of the other player yielding. Purchase of an SUV
would then be rational, reducing the cost of time delays to
the owner. (There is of course then a higher level game
when the other road users can buy similar vehicles, beyond
the scope of our present model.) For simplicity we retain
the assumption that both players have the same time delay
utilities, Utime as in the previous model, but we now con-
sider scenarios where one player is stronger than the other,
as (UYcrash,U
X
crash) = (Ucrash,rUcrash), for ratios r ∈ [1,100].
When utilities become asymmetric it is possible that more
equilibria will be present, so we switch to numerical com-
putation of them using the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
Meta-strategy convergence. The asymmetric chicken
model may have multiple equilibria which are not fully
disambiguated by dominance and ESS solutions concepts.
We propose a novel (to our knowledge) solution concept
for use in solving this and other models, which we call
meta-strategy convergence. This is based on everything we
Figure 2: Strategy selection (1) and backward induction state probability (2-3) equations.
P(aY = 1|y,x, t) =
vYy−1,x−2,t+1− v
Y
y−2,x−2,t+1
vYy−1,x−2,t+1+ v
Y
y−2,x−1,t+1− v
Y
y−1,x−1,t+1− v
Y
y−2,x−2,t+1
P(yinit ,xinit , tinit) = 1,P(yinit ,x 6= xinit , tinit) = 0,P(y 6= yinit ,xinit , tinit) = 0
P(y,x, t) = ∑
∆y∈1,2
∑
∆x∈1,2
P(aY = ∆y,aX = ∆x|y−∆y,x−∆x, t−1)P(y−∆y,x−∆x, t−1)
currently know about the ‘rational’ process of equilibrium
pruning and selection, including the absence of information
in some cases, and on a temporal ordering of rational rea-
soning. After removing dominated and non-ESS equilibria,
we know of no good remaining solution concepts under the
assumption that the other player is also rational. (Trem-
bling hand, basins etc. make a different assumption about
a fallible opponent, but for AVs which will eventually in-
teract with other autonomous vehicles, we want all players
to be completely mechanized and rational.) In the absence
of any other way to select from the remaining equilibria’s
strategies, we form a new meta-strategy which chooses one
of them from a flat (maximum entropy) prior. By sym-
metry, there is no way to prefer any over any other, hence
their selection probabilities must be equal, given this state
of knowledge. Curiously, this is equivalent to a new strategy
which averages the action probabilities from each remain-
ing strategy, yet is not itself in that set, because it is an aver-
age between them. Hence, it is not a member of any equilib-
rium and cannot be an optimal strategy itself. However, we
have derived it step-by-step over time in a completely ra-
tional way. It is our best solution so far at this new point in
time. As it is our best rational solution at this time, the other
player will also compute that we have reached it. We then
consider, as in standard fictitious play, what the other player
will do next. They will apply fictitious play to modify their
strategy in response. Then we will modify ours, and they
will modify theirs again. This will iterate until we converge,
unambiguously, onto a specific and uniquely defined one
of the original equilibria. This contains the rational strate-
gies for both players, and can be reached deterministically
by both of them without the need for any pre-established
conventions or communications. Like all solution concepts,
this is something of a philosophical rather than purely math-
ematical argument. It is the best argument currently known
to us so we consider it to be rational for the AV control
tasks.
Temporal gauge invariance. The state values of the
game theoretic models above are presented as functions
of (y,x, t) but our current implementation makes use of
an approximation to reduce the number of sub-games to
be solved and thus the computation time. Because both
player’s utilities are linear functions of time, we may (up
to a small error in the ratio of crash to delay utilities)
choose different gauges to measure time, such as consid-
ering the time of every turn game to be t = 0. When the
first player, say Y , reaches the intersection, we assign val-
ues (vY0,x,v
X
0,x) = (0, −Utimex/2) as it will take X a fur-
ther x/2 seconds to reach the intersection at maximum
speed 2m/s now the road is clear. (Also (vY1,x,v
X
1,x) = (0,
−Utime(x−1)/2) to handle the other required end states in
Figure 3: State values for turn-taking game.
the same way.) This simplifies all state values and functions
of them to be functions only of (y,x). Removing depen-
dence on t also makes it simpler to visualize results as 2D
(y,x) matrices.
3 Results
Assume Ucrash =−20 and Utime = 1 throughout. (This
values a crash as being equally bad as a 100 second delay
reaching the intersection. In the real world the crash penalty
would be much larger, but smaller ones produce more easily
visualizable results for our present purpose.)
Turn-taking model. The value function for Y in the
turn-taking model is shown in fig. 3. The game is sym-
metric so X has the same function when the player’s names
are swapped. The turn taking model is fully deterministic,
because full information is available to each player when
it is their turn. Fig. 4 and 5 show simulated runs begin-
ning at asymmetric (y 6= x) and symmetric (y = x) start-
ing states.When the vehicles start with very different differ-
ences, e.g. (y = 12,x = 8) they both proceed at full speed
(2m/s) and avoid each other. When started at identical dis-
tances, such as (y = 10,x = 10), the initial turn-taking ad-
vantage becomes the tie-breaker, in both parties interests.
Collisions never occur in the turn-taking model due to its
determinism.
Sequential chicken model. Fig. 6 shows the value ma-
trix for games with vehicles at up to 20m from the intersec-
tion, and fig. 7 show the optimal strategies.
Fig. 8 shows the state space probabilities and fig. 9
shows a stochastic sample, starting with large time (2 sec-
onds) gap between the vehicles. All probabilities in the state
space are very close to 0 or 1, so the outcome is almost de-
terministic as in the turn-taking model of the same setting.
Figure 4: Simulation of turn taking game, differing starts.
Figure 5: Simulation of turn taking game, equal starts.
Figure 6: Sequential chicken state values.
Figure 7: Sequential chicken optimal strategy.
Figure 8: Sequential chicken state probabilities, from asym-
metric start (12,10).
Figure 9: Sequential chicken simulation, from asymmetric
start (12,10).
Fig. 10 shows state space probabilities when the ve-
hicles start at identical distances y = x = 10. In this case,
the outcome is different from the turn-taking model, be-
cause the game is fully symmetric but the symmetry is no
longer broken by turn-taking. This means that both players
must employ a policy consisting of mixed strategies until
the symmetry is broken by one of them. The optimal policy
is to yield with an increasing probability as distance to colli-
sion decreases, as seen in fig. 7. Fig. 11 is a typical sample
simulation drawn from the above state probabilities. The
most common outcome is for one vehicle to yield at a ran-
dom time, with yield probability increasing as the vehicles
draw closer.
Occasionally, as in fig. 12, both players choose to yield
at the same time, prolonging the conflict and costing them
both a delay. Very occasionally a collision will occur as
a result of this process, when the players fail to negotiate
priority before both reaching the intersection together. This
is rare, but must have a non-zero probability, computed and
denoted as Pcrash.
The collision probability with Ucrash = −20 is 1.79%,
and with Ucrash = −100 it lowers to 0.7%. It is interesting
to test how choice of this scaling (versus the fixedUtime=1)
affects the residual collision probability, because if it has
a large effect then any realistic model will require scal-
ing calibration against some empirical data. Assuming that
Figure 10: Sequential chicken state probabilities, from sym-
metric start (10,10).
Figure 11: Sequential chicken typical simulation, from
symmetric start (10,10).
both players continue to share the same utility function, and
know this to be the case, fig. 13 shows the effect of vary-
ing the collision utility scale while keeping the time utilities
fixed.
This suggests that choices in range [-1000,0] do have
large effects on the collision probability, but penalties worse
than -1000 are much the same as each other in this effect. In
real life, the cost of crashing a car (even very slightly) is al-
most always vastly larger than that of losing a few seconds
journey time. This graph suggests that for these realistic
Figure 12: Sequential chicken atypical simulation, from
symmetric start (10,10).
Figure 13
Figure 14
penalties, the precise choice of shared collision penalty val-
ues is unimportant as long as it is over 1000 times worse
than a 1 second time delay penalty.
Asymmetric utility model. As hypothesized, asymmetric
collision penalties (such as our AV encountering a strong
SUV or a weak cyclist or pedestrian) have a large effect
on who must yield, and with a very small change in the
probability of actual collision. This small change is the key
to breaking symmetry and ensuring strong probability of the
weaker player yielding fig. 14.
4 Conclusion
In all the models, when one agent has any small advan-
tage it is usually – but probabilistically – optimal for both
agents for the strong one to take the priority and the weak
one to yield.
It is essential that there is some small but strictly non-
zero probability of collision being allowed to occur as a
consequence of both sides’ optimal strategies. It is impos-
sible for an AV to make any progress at all if this is not the
case, because given this knowledge, every single other road
user could dominate them in any conflict - even pedestrians
jumping out in front of them for fun as seen in real-world
trials (Madigan et al., 2016). Under these models, it is es-
sential that AVs are programmed with a non-zero probabil-
ity of deliberately causing a collision. This may be legally
difficult, as such programming may be argued to constitute
not only manslaughter but also murder, being rationally pre-
meditated by the software engineer.
These results are interesting as they suggests that pur-
chasing SUVs, or armoring our autonomous vehicle like an
SUV, is a very rational strategy, not in order to better survive
the rare collisions that do occur, but to ensure a high prob-
ability of other vehicles getting out of our way to save our
time and money on delays. By adding armor to our own ve-
hicle we can make the optimal strategy for the other player
yielding tend towards certainty at every encounter. This also
models what will happen when our AV encounters a pedes-
trian. The larger cost of collision to the pedestrian than to
our AV gives us a strong position, from which we can act
aggressively and be confident that the pedestrian will yield.
The answer to ‘When should the chicken cross then road?’
is ‘quite rarely if there is a car coming, but with non-zero
probability’.
We found that the way in which the models quantize
time is important. The turn-taking model artificially re-
moved most of the subtly of game theory by breaking its
symmetry via the turn taking mechanism itself. This sug-
gests that such a quantization is not a good model for the
real world, it hides the main problem of the scenario from
the start. A related modeling issue around time relates to
Zeno’s Paradox. In the models presented here, time ticks
are discrete and of equal length. It might be argued that
two Zeno-like players could choose to define each of their
ticks to have half the duration of the previous one, and thus
create an infinite number of ticks which would be certain
to eventually lead to an asymmetric yield and avoidance of
collision. Formal mathematical analysis of this claim could
form future work, though in practice, any human or ma-
chine compute system has some finite limit on its computa-
tion speed.
Extended models should handle speed more realisti-
cally. Rather than just two discrete speeds, a continuum of
speeds should be available, including stopping at a complete
halt. Continuous speeds may require sampling approxima-
tions to compute over, while complete halts allow for po-
tentially infinite time games which require further consid-
eration to model. Human drivers when faced with, for ex-
ample, a busy motorway merge, may gradually slow down
towards a halt at the end of the slip-road, while drivers in
their path may do the same. Perhaps under a continuous
speed model this behavior can be shown to converge safely
as everyone slows down towards a halt and reduces both
the probability and penalty of collisions. Nevertheless, the
underlying logic must still hold - that there must be a cred-
ible threat of a non-zero probability of causing some colli-
sion, in order that the other party cannot take advantage of
the AV every time. Future models should add further re-
alistic details to the framework. Real drivers do not know
each other’s utility functions and must infer them in an in-
formation game during the interaction. This could include
giving and reading signals about utility such as the model,
age, colour and cleanliness of their cars, their lateral posi-
tions on the road, their facial expressions and hand gestures
as well as more formal car signaling via light flashing and
horn usage. Real drivers may not have Markovian time de-
lay utilities and more detailed models should allow for time
dimensioned value functions v(y,x, t) rather than than sim-
pler v(y,x) used here. Traffic regulations and conventions
such as legally binding and non-binding signs and lights,
and the cost of public humiliation or legal action for being
seen or recorded breaking them should be added to modify
utilities. Such models suggest new signaling conventions
for autonomous vehicles, such as use of V2V radio com-
munications and virtual currencies to aid negotiations; or
the use of small AV-mounted water-pistols to induce small
negative utilities in assertive pedestrians in place of actually
hitting them.
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